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 Abstract
 
    This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
    (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which
    can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay
    protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the
    Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP).
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 1.  Introduction
 
    This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
    (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which
    can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay
    protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP,
    RTCP (the Real-time Transport Control Protocol) [RFC3350].
 
    SRTP provides a framework for encryption and message authentication
    of RTP and RTCP streams (Section 3).  SRTP defines a set of default
    cryptographic transforms (Sections 4 and 5), and it allows new
    transforms to be introduced in the future (Section 6).  With
    appropriate key management (Sections 7 and 8), SRTP is secure
    (Sections 9) for unicast and multicast RTP applications (Section 11).
 
    SRTP can achieve high throughput and low packet expansion.  SRTP
    proves to be a suitable protection for heterogeneous environments
    (mix of wired and wireless networks).  To get such features, default
    transforms are described, based on an additive stream cipher for
    encryption, a keyed-hash based function for message authentication,
    and an "implicit" index for sequencing/synchronization based on the
    RTP sequence number for SRTP and an index number for Secure RTCP
    (SRTCP).
 
 1.1.  Notational Conventions
 
    The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].  The
    terminology conforms to [RFC2828] with the following exception.  For
    simplicity we use the term "random" throughout the document to denote
    randomly or pseudo-randomly generated values.  Large amounts of
    random bits may be difficult to obtain, and for the security of SRTP,
    pseudo-randomness is sufficient [RFC1750].
 
    By convention, the adopted representation is the network byte order,
    i.e., the left most bit (octet) is the most significant one.  By XOR
    we mean bitwise addition modulo 2 of binary strings, and || denotes
    concatenation.  In other words, if C = A || B, then the most
    significant bits of C are the bits of A, and the least significant
    bits of C equal the bits of B.  Hexadecimal numbers are prefixed by
    0x.
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    The word "encryption" includes also use of the NULL algorithm (which
    in practice does leave the data in the clear).
 
    With slight abuse of notation, we use the terms "message
    authentication" and "authentication tag" as is common practice, even
    though in some circumstances, e.g., group communication, the service
    provided is actually only integrity protection and not data origin
    authentication.
 
 2.  Goals and Features
 
    The security goals for SRTP are to ensure:
 
    *  the confidentiality of the RTP and RTCP payloads, and
 
    *  the integrity of the entire RTP and RTCP packets, together with
       protection against replayed packets.
 
    These security services are optional and independent from each other,
    except that SRTCP integrity protection is mandatory (malicious or
    erroneous alteration of RTCP messages could otherwise disrupt the
    processing of the RTP stream).
 
    Other, functional, goals for the protocol are:
 
    *  a framework that permits upgrading with new cryptographic
       transforms,
 
    *  low bandwidth cost, i.e., a framework preserving RTP header
       compression efficiency,
 
    and, asserted by the pre-defined transforms:
 
    *  a low computational cost,
 
    *  a small footprint (i.e., small code size and data memory for
       keying information and replay lists),
 
    *  limited packet expansion to support the bandwidth economy goal,
 
    *  independence from the underlying transport, network, and physical
       layers used by RTP, in particular high tolerance to packet loss
       and re-ordering.
 
    These properties ensure that SRTP is a suitable protection scheme for
    RTP/RTCP in both wired and wireless scenarios.
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 2.1.  Features
 
    Besides the above mentioned direct goals, SRTP provides for some
    additional features.  They have been introduced to lighten the burden
    on key management and to further increase security.  They include:
 
    *  A single "master key" can provide keying material for
       confidentiality and integrity protection, both for the SRTP stream
       and the corresponding SRTCP stream.  This is achieved with a key
       derivation function (see Section 4.3), providing "session keys"
       for the respective security primitive, securely derived from the
       master key.
 
    *  In addition, the key derivation can be configured to periodically
       refresh the session keys, which limits the amount of ciphertext
       produced by a fixed key, available for an adversary to
       cryptanalyze.
 
    *  "Salting keys" are used to protect against pre-computation and
       time-memory tradeoff attacks [MF00] [BS00].
 
    Detailed rationale for these features can be found in Section 7.
 
 3.  SRTP Framework
 
    RTP is the Real-time Transport Protocol [RFC3550].  We define SRTP as
    a profile of RTP.  This profile is an extension to the RTP
    Audio/Video Profile [RFC3551].  Except where explicitly noted, all
    aspects of that profile apply, with the addition of the SRTP security
    features.  Conceptually, we consider SRTP to be a "bump in the stack"
    implementation which resides between the RTP application and the
    transport layer.  SRTP intercepts RTP packets and then forwards an
    equivalent SRTP packet on the sending side, and intercepts SRTP
    packets and passes an equivalent RTP packet up the stack on the
    receiving side.
 
    Secure RTCP (SRTCP) provides the same security services to RTCP as
    SRTP does to RTP.  SRTCP message authentication is MANDATORY and
    thereby protects the RTCP fields to keep track of membership, provide
    feedback to RTP senders, or maintain packet sequence counters.  SRTCP
    is described in Section 3.4.
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 3.1.  Secure RTP
 
       The format of an SRTP packet is illustrated in Figure 1.
 
         0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
      |V=2|P|X|  CC   |M|     PT      |       sequence number         | |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
      |                           timestamp                           | |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
      |           synchronization source (SSRC) identifier            | |
      +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
      |            contributing source (CSRC) identifiers             | |
      |                               ....                            | |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
      |                   RTP extension (OPTIONAL)                    | |
    +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | |                          payload  ...                         | |
    | |                               +-------------------------------+ |
    | |                               | RTP padding   | RTP pad count | |
    +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
    | ~                     SRTP MKI (OPTIONAL)                       ~ |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | :                 authentication tag (RECOMMENDED)              : |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    |                                                                   |
    +- Encrypted Portion*                      Authenticated Portion ---+
 
    Figure 1.  The format of an SRTP packet.  *Encrypted Portion is the
    same size as the plaintext for the Section 4 pre-defined transforms.
 
    The "Encrypted Portion" of an SRTP packet consists of the encryption
    of the RTP payload (including RTP padding when present) of the
    equivalent RTP packet.  The Encrypted Portion MAY be the exact size
    of the plaintext or MAY be larger.  Figure 1 shows the RTP payload
    including any possible padding for RTP [RFC3550].
 
    None of the pre-defined encryption transforms uses any padding; for
    these, the RTP and SRTP payload sizes match exactly.  New transforms
    added to SRTP (following Section 6) may require padding, and may
    hence produce larger payloads.  RTP provides its own padding format
    (as seen in Fig. 1), which due to the padding indicator in the RTP
    header has merits in terms of compactness relative to paddings using
    prefix-free codes.  This RTP padding SHALL be the default method for
    transforms requiring padding.  Transforms MAY specify other padding
    methods, and MUST then specify the amount, format, and processing of
    their padding.  It is important to note that encryption transforms
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    that use padding are vulnerable to subtle attacks, especially when
    message authentication is not used [V02].  Each specification for a
    new encryption transform needs to carefully consider and describe the
    security implications of the padding that it uses.  Message
    authentication codes define their own padding, so this default does
    not apply to authentication transforms.
 
    The OPTIONAL MKI and the RECOMMENDED authentication tag are the only
    fields defined by SRTP that are not in RTP.  Only 8-bit alignment is
    assumed.
 
       MKI (Master Key Identifier): configurable length, OPTIONAL.  The
               MKI is defined, signaled, and used by key management.  The
               MKI identifies the master key from which the session
               key(s) were derived that authenticate and/or encrypt the
               particular packet.  Note that the MKI SHALL NOT identify
               the SRTP cryptographic context, which is identified
               according to Section 3.2.3.  The MKI MAY be used by key
               management for the purposes of re-keying, identifying a
               particular master key within the cryptographic context
               (Section 3.2.1).
 
       Authentication tag: configurable length, RECOMMENDED.  The
               authentication tag is used to carry message authentication
               data.  The Authenticated Portion of an SRTP packet
               consists of the RTP header followed by the Encrypted
               Portion of the SRTP packet.  Thus, if both encryption and
               authentication are applied, encryption SHALL be applied
               before authentication on the sender side and conversely on
               the receiver side.  The authentication tag provides
               authentication of the RTP header and payload, and it
               indirectly provides replay protection by authenticating
               the sequence number.  Note that the MKI is not integrity
               protected as this does not provide any extra protection.
 
 3.2.  SRTP Cryptographic Contexts
 
    Each SRTP stream requires the sender and receiver to maintain
    cryptographic state information.  This information is called the
    "cryptographic context".
 
    SRTP uses two types of keys: session keys and master keys.  By a
    "session key", we mean a key which is used directly in a
    cryptographic transform (e.g., encryption or message authentication),
    and by a "master key", we mean a random bit string (given by the key
    management protocol) from which session keys are derived in a
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    cryptographically secure way.  The master key(s) and other parameters
    in the cryptographic context are provided by key management
    mechanisms external to SRTP, see Section 8.
 
 3.2.1.  Transform-independent parameters
 
    Transform-independent parameters are present in the cryptographic
    context independently of the particular encryption or authentication
    transforms that are used.  The transform-independent parameters of
    the cryptographic context for SRTP consist of:
 
    *  a 32-bit unsigned rollover counter (ROC), which records how many
       times the 16-bit RTP sequence number has been reset to zero after
       passing through 65,535.  Unlike the sequence number (SEQ), which
       SRTP extracts from the RTP packet header, the ROC is maintained by
       SRTP as described in Section 3.3.1.
 
       We define the index of the SRTP packet corresponding to a given
       ROC and RTP sequence number to be the 48-bit quantity
 
             i = 2^16 * ROC + SEQ.
 
    *  for the receiver only, a 16-bit sequence number s_l, which can be
       thought of as the highest received RTP sequence number (see
       Section 3.3.1 for its handling), which SHOULD be authenticated
       since message authentication is RECOMMENDED,
 
    *  an identifier for the encryption algorithm, i.e., the cipher and
       its mode of operation,
 
    *  an identifier for the message authentication algorithm,
 
    *  a replay list, maintained by the receiver only (when
       authentication and replay protection are provided), containing
       indices of recently received and authenticated SRTP packets,
 
    *  an MKI indicator (0/1) as to whether an MKI is present in SRTP and
       SRTCP packets,
 
    *  if the MKI indicator is set to one, the length (in octets) of the
       MKI field, and (for the sender) the actual value of the currently
       active MKI (the value of the MKI indicator and length MUST be kept
       fixed for the lifetime of the context),
 
    *  the master key(s), which MUST be random and kept secret,
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    *  for each master key, there is a counter of the number of SRTP
       packets that have been processed (sent) with that master key
       (essential for security, see Sections 3.3.1 and 9),
 
    *  non-negative integers n_e, and n_a, determining the length of the
       session keys for encryption, and message authentication.
 
    In addition, for each master key, an SRTP stream MAY use the
    following associated values:
 
    *  a master salt, to be used in the key derivation of session keys.
       This value, when used, MUST be random, but MAY be public.  Use of
       master salt is strongly RECOMMENDED, see Section 9.2.  A "NULL"
       salt is treated as 00...0.
 
    *  an integer in the set {1,2,4,...,2^24}, the "key_derivation_rate",
       where an unspecified value is treated as zero.  The constraint to
       be a power of 2 simplifies the session-key derivation
       implementation, see Section 4.3.
 
    *  an MKI value,
 
    *  <From, To> values, specifying the lifetime for a master key,
       expressed in terms of the two 48-bit index values inside whose
       range (including the range end-points) the master key is valid.
       For the use of <From, To>, see Section 8.1.1.  <From, To> is an
       alternative to the MKI and assumes that a master key is in one-
       to-one correspondence with the SRTP session key on which the
       <From, To> range is defined.
 
    SRTCP SHALL by default share the crypto context with SRTP, except:
 
    *  no rollover counter and s_l-value need to be maintained as the
       RTCP index is explicitly carried in each SRTCP packet,
 
    *  a separate replay list is maintained (when replay protection is
       provided),
 
    *  SRTCP maintains a separate counter for its master key (even if the
       master key is the same as that for SRTP, see below), as a means to
       maintain a count of the number of SRTCP packets that have been
       processed with that key.
 
    Note in particular that the master key(s) MAY be shared between SRTP
    and the corresponding SRTCP, if the pre-defined transforms (including
    the key derivation) are used but the session key(s) MUST NOT be so
    shared.
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    In addition, there can be cases (see Sections 8 and 9.1) where
    several SRTP streams within a given RTP session, identified by their
    synchronization source (SSRCs, which is part of the RTP header),
    share most of the crypto context parameters (including possibly
    master and session keys).  In such cases, just as in the normal
    SRTP/SRTCP parameter sharing above, separate replay lists and packet
    counters for each stream (SSRC) MUST still be maintained.  Also,
    separate SRTP indices MUST then be maintained.
 
    A summary of parameters, pre-defined transforms, and default values
    for the above parameters (and other SRTP parameters) can be found in
    Sections 5 and 8.2.
 
 3.2.2.  Transform-dependent parameters
 
    All encryption, authentication/integrity, and key derivation
    parameters are defined in the transforms section (Section 4).
    Typical examples of such parameters are block size of ciphers,
    session keys, data for the Initialization Vector (IV) formation, etc.
    Future SRTP transform specifications MUST include a section to list
    the additional cryptographic context’s parameters for that transform,
    if any.
 
 3.2.3.  Mapping SRTP Packets to Cryptographic Contexts
 
    Recall that an RTP session for each participant is defined [RFC3550]
    by a pair of destination transport addresses (one network address
    plus a port pair for RTP and RTCP), and that a multimedia session is
    defined as a collection of RTP sessions.  For example, a particular
    multimedia session could include an audio RTP session, a video RTP
    session, and a text RTP session.
 
    A cryptographic context SHALL be uniquely identified by the triplet
    context identifier:
 
    context id = <SSRC, destination network address, destination
    transport port number>
 
    where the destination network address and the destination transport
    port are the ones in the SRTP packet.  It is assumed that, when
    presented with this information, the key management returns a context
    with the information as described in Section 3.2.
 
    As noted above, SRTP and SRTCP by default share the bulk of the
    parameters in the cryptographic context.  Thus, retrieving the crypto
    context parameters for an SRTCP stream in practice may imply a
    binding to the correspondent SRTP crypto context.  It is up to the
    implementation to assure such binding, since the RTCP port may not be
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    directly deducible from the RTP port only.  Alternatively, the key
    management may choose to provide separate SRTP- and SRTCP- contexts,
    duplicating the common parameters (such as master key(s)).  The
    latter approach then also enables SRTP and SRTCP to use, e.g.,
    distinct transforms, if so desired.  Similar considerations arise
    when multiple SRTP streams, forming part of one single RTP session,
    share keys and other parameters.
 
    If no valid context can be found for a packet corresponding to a
    certain context identifier, that packet MUST be discarded.
 
 3.3.  SRTP Packet Processing
 
    The following applies to SRTP.  SRTCP is described in Section 3.4.
 
    Assuming initialization of the cryptographic context(s) has taken
    place via key management, the sender SHALL do the following to
    construct an SRTP packet:
 
    1. Determine which cryptographic context to use as described in
       Section 3.2.3.
 
    2. Determine the index of the SRTP packet using the rollover counter,
       the highest sequence number in the cryptographic context, and the
       sequence number in the RTP packet, as described in Section 3.3.1.
 
    3. Determine the master key and master salt.  This is done using the
       index determined in the previous step or the current MKI in the
       cryptographic context, according to Section 8.1.
 
    4. Determine the session keys and session salt (if they are used by
       the transform) as described in Section 4.3, using master key,
       master salt, key_derivation_rate, and session key-lengths in the
       cryptographic context with the index, determined in Steps 2 and 3.
 
    5. Encrypt the RTP payload to produce the Encrypted Portion of the
       packet (see Section 4.1, for the defined ciphers).  This step uses
       the encryption algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context,
       the session encryption key and the session salt (if used) found in
       Step 4 together with the index found in Step 2.
 
    6. If the MKI indicator is set to one, append the MKI to the packet.
 
    7. For message authentication, compute the authentication tag for the
       Authenticated Portion of the packet, as described in Section 4.2.
       This step uses the current rollover counter, the authentication
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       algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context, and the session
       authentication key found in Step 4.  Append the authentication tag
       to the packet.
 
    8. If necessary, update the ROC as in Section 3.3.1, using the packet
       index determined in Step 2.
 
    To authenticate and decrypt an SRTP packet, the receiver SHALL do the
    following:
 
    1. Determine which cryptographic context to use as described in
       Section 3.2.3.
 
    2. Run the algorithm in Section 3.3.1 to get the index of the SRTP
       packet.  The algorithm uses the rollover counter and highest
       sequence number in the cryptographic context with the sequence
       number in the SRTP packet, as described in Section 3.3.1.
 
    3. Determine the master key and master salt.  If the MKI indicator in
       the context is set to one, use the MKI in the SRTP packet,
       otherwise use the index from the previous step, according to
       Section 8.1.
 
    4. Determine the session keys, and session salt (if used by the
       transform) as described in Section 4.3, using master key, master
       salt, key_derivation_rate and session key-lengths in the
       cryptographic context with the index, determined in Steps 2 and 3.
 
    5. For message authentication and replay protection, first check if
       the packet has been replayed (Section 3.3.2), using the Replay
       List and the index as determined in Step 2.  If the packet is
       judged to be replayed, then the packet MUST be discarded, and the
       event SHOULD be logged.
 
       Next, perform verification of the authentication tag, using the
       rollover counter from Step 2, the authentication algorithm
       indicated in the cryptographic context, and the session
       authentication key from Step 4.  If the result is "AUTHENTICATION
       FAILURE" (see Section 4.2), the packet MUST be discarded from
       further processing and the event SHOULD be logged.
 
    6. Decrypt the Encrypted Portion of the packet (see Section 4.1, for
       the defined ciphers), using the decryption algorithm indicated in
       the cryptographic context, the session encryption key and salt (if
       used) found in Step 4 with the index from Step 2.
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    7. Update the rollover counter and highest sequence number, s_l, in
       the cryptographic context as in Section 3.3.1, using the packet
       index estimated in Step 2.  If replay protection is provided, also
       update the Replay List as described in Section 3.3.2.
 
    8. When present, remove the MKI and authentication tag fields from
       the packet.
 
 3.3.1.  Packet Index Determination, and ROC, s_l Update
 
    SRTP implementations use an "implicit" packet index for sequencing,
    i.e., not all of the index is explicitly carried in the SRTP packet.
    For the pre-defined transforms, the index i is used in replay
    protection (Section 3.3.2), encryption (Section 4.1), message
    authentication (Section 4.2), and for the key derivation (Section
    4.3).
 
    When the session starts, the sender side MUST set the rollover
    counter, ROC, to zero.  Each time the RTP sequence number, SEQ, wraps
    modulo 2^16, the sender side MUST increment ROC by one, modulo 2^32
    (see security aspects below).  The sender’s packet index is then
    defined as
 
       i = 2^16 * ROC + SEQ.
 
    Receiver-side implementations use the RTP sequence number to
    determine the correct index of a packet, which is the location of the
    packet in the sequence of all SRTP packets.  A robust approach for
    the proper use of a rollover counter requires its handling and use to
    be well defined.  In particular, out-of-order RTP packets with
    sequence numbers close to 2^16 or zero must be properly handled.
 
    The index estimate is based on the receiver’s locally maintained ROC
    and s_l values.  At the setup of the session, the ROC MUST be set to
    zero.  Receivers joining an on-going session MUST be given the
    current ROC value using out-of-band signaling such as key-management
    signaling.  Furthermore, the receiver SHALL initialize s_l to the RTP
    sequence number (SEQ) of the first observed SRTP packet (unless the
    initial value is provided by out of band signaling such as key
    management).
 
    On consecutive SRTP packets, the receiver SHOULD estimate the index
    as
          i = 2^16 * v + SEQ,
 
    where v is chosen from the set { ROC-1, ROC, ROC+1 } (modulo 2^32)
    such that i is closest (in modulo 2^48 sense) to the value 2^16 * ROC
    + s_l (see Appendix A for pseudocode).
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    After the packet has been processed and authenticated (when enabled
    for SRTP packets for the session), the receiver MUST use v to
    conditionally update its s_l and ROC variables as follows.  If
    v=(ROC-1) mod 2^32, then there is no update to s_l or ROC.  If v=ROC,
    then s_l is set to SEQ if and only if SEQ is larger than the current
    s_l; there is no change to ROC.  If v=(ROC+1) mod 2^32, then s_l is
    set to SEQ and ROC is set to v.
 
    After a re-keying occurs (changing to a new master key), the rollover
    counter always maintains its sequence of values, i.e., it MUST NOT be
    reset to zero.
 
    As the rollover counter is 32 bits long and the sequence number is 16
    bits long, the maximum number of packets belonging to a given SRTP
    stream that can be secured with the same key is 2^48 using the pre-
    defined transforms.  After that number of SRTP packets have been sent
    with a given (master or session) key, the sender MUST NOT send any
    more packets with that key.  (There exists a similar limit for SRTCP,
    which in practice may be more restrictive, see Section 9.2.)  This
    limitation enforces a security benefit by providing an upper bound on
    the amount of traffic that can pass before cryptographic keys are
    changed.  Re-keying (see Section 8.1) MUST be triggered, before this
    amount of traffic, and MAY be triggered earlier, e.g., for increased
    security and access control to media.  Recurring key derivation by
    means of a non-zero key_derivation_rate (see Section 4.3), also gives
    stronger security but does not change the above absolute maximum
    value.
 
    On the receiver side, there is a caveat to updating s_l and ROC: if
    message authentication is not present, neither the initialization of
    s_l, nor the ROC update can be made completely robust.  The
    receiver’s "implicit index" approach works for the pre-defined
    transforms as long as the reorder and loss of the packets are not too
    great and bit-errors do not occur in unfortunate ways.  In
    particular, 2^15 packets would need to be lost, or a packet would
    need to be 2^15 packets out of sequence before synchronization is
    lost.  Such drastic loss or reorder is likely to disrupt the RTP
    application itself.
 
    The algorithm for the index estimate and ROC update is a matter of
    implementation, and should take into consideration the environment
    (e.g., packet loss rate) and the cases when synchronization is likely
    to be lost, e.g., when the initial sequence number (randomly chosen
    by RTP) is not known in advance (not sent in the key management
    protocol) but may be near to wrap modulo 2^16.
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    A more elaborate and more robust scheme than the one given above is
    the handling of RTP’s own "rollover counter", see Appendix A.1 of
    [RFC3550].
 
 3.3.2.  Replay Protection
 
    Secure replay protection is only possible when integrity protection
    is present.  It is RECOMMENDED to use replay protection, both for RTP
    and RTCP, as integrity protection alone cannot assure security
    against replay attacks.
 
    A packet is "replayed" when it is stored by an adversary, and then
    re-injected into the network.  When message authentication is
    provided, SRTP protects against such attacks through a Replay List.
    Each SRTP receiver maintains a Replay List, which conceptually
    contains the indices of all of the packets which have been received
    and authenticated.  In practice, the list can use a "sliding window"
    approach, so that a fixed amount of storage suffices for replay
    protection.  Packet indices which lag behind the packet index in the
    context by more than SRTP-WINDOW-SIZE can be assumed to have been
    received, where SRTP-WINDOW-SIZE is a receiver-side, implementation-
    dependent parameter and MUST be at least 64, but which MAY be set to
    a higher value.
 
    The receiver checks the index of an incoming packet against the
    replay list and the window.  Only packets with index ahead of the
    window, or, inside the window but not already received, SHALL be
    accepted.
 
    After the packet has been authenticated (if necessary the window is
    first moved ahead), the replay list SHALL be updated with the new
    index.
 
    The Replay List can be efficiently implemented by using a bitmap to
    represent which packets have been received, as described in the
    Security Architecture for IP [RFC2401].
 
 3.4.  Secure RTCP
 
    Secure RTCP follows the definition of Secure RTP.  SRTCP adds three
    mandatory new fields (the SRTCP index, an "encrypt-flag", and the
    authentication tag) and one optional field (the MKI) to the RTCP
    packet definition.  The three mandatory fields MUST be appended to an
    RTCP packet in order to form an equivalent SRTCP packet.  The added
    fields follow any other profile-specific extensions.
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    According to Section 6.1 of [RFC3550], there is a REQUIRED packet
    format for compound packets.  SRTCP MUST be given packets according
    to that requirement in the sense that the first part MUST be a sender
    report or a receiver report.  However, the RTCP encryption prefix (a
    random 32-bit quantity) specified in that Section MUST NOT be used
    since, as is stated there, it is only applicable to the encryption
    method specified in [RFC3550] and is not needed by the cryptographic
    mechanisms used in SRTP.
 
       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
      |V=2|P|    RC   |   PT=SR or RR   |             length          | |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
      |                         SSRC of sender                        | |
    +>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
    | ~                          sender info                          ~ |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | ~                         report block 1                        ~ |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | ~                         report block 2                        ~ |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | ~                              ...                              ~ |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | |V=2|P|    SC   |  PT=SDES=202  |             length            | |
    | +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
    | |                          SSRC/CSRC_1                          | |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | ~                           SDES items                          ~ |
    | +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
    | ~                              ...                              ~ |
    +>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
    | |E|                         SRTCP index                         | |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
    | ~                     SRTCP MKI (OPTIONAL)                      ~ |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    | :                     authentication tag                        : |
    | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
    |                                                                   |
    +-- Encrypted Portion                    Authenticated Portion -----+
 
 
    Figure 2.  An example of the format of a Secure RTCP packet,
    consisting of an underlying RTCP compound packet with a Sender Report
    and SDES packet.
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    The Encrypted Portion of an SRTCP packet consists of the encryption
    (Section 4.1) of the RTCP payload of the equivalent compound RTCP
    packet, from the first RTCP packet, i.e., from the ninth (9) octet to
    the end of the compound packet.  The Authenticated Portion of an
    SRTCP packet consists of the entire equivalent (eventually compound)
    RTCP packet, the E flag, and the SRTCP index (after any encryption
    has been applied to the payload).
 
    The added fields are:
 
    E-flag: 1 bit, REQUIRED
             The E-flag indicates if the current SRTCP packet is
             encrypted or unencrypted.  Section 9.1 of [RFC3550] allows
             the split of a compound RTCP packet into two lower-layer
             packets, one to be encrypted and one to be sent in the
             clear.  The E bit set to "1" indicates encrypted packet, and
             "0" indicates non-encrypted packet.
 
    SRTCP index: 31 bits, REQUIRED
             The SRTCP index is a 31-bit counter for the SRTCP packet.
             The index is explicitly included in each packet, in contrast
             to the "implicit" index approach used for SRTP.  The SRTCP
             index MUST be set to zero before the first SRTCP packet is
             sent, and MUST be incremented by one, modulo 2^31, after
             each SRTCP packet is sent.  In particular, after a re-key,
             the SRTCP index MUST NOT be reset to zero again.
 
    Authentication Tag: configurable length, REQUIRED
             The authentication tag is used to carry message
             authentication data.
 
    MKI: configurable length, OPTIONAL
             The MKI is the Master Key Indicator, and functions according
             to the MKI definition in Section 3.
 
    SRTCP uses the cryptographic context parameters and packet processing
    of SRTP by default, with the following changes:
 
    *  The receiver does not need to "estimate" the index, as it is
       explicitly signaled in the packet.
 
    *  Pre-defined SRTCP encryption is as specified in Section 4.1, but
       using the definition of the SRTCP Encrypted Portion given in this
       section, and using the SRTCP index as the index i.  The encryption
       transform and related parameters SHALL by default be the same
       selected for the protection of the associated SRTP stream(s),
       while the NULL algorithm SHALL be applied to the RTCP packets not
       to be encrypted.  SRTCP may have a different encryption transform
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       than the one used by the corresponding SRTP.  The expected use for
       this feature is when the former has NULL-encryption and the latter
       has a non NULL-encryption.
 
    The E-flag is assigned a value by the sender depending on whether the
    packet was encrypted or not.
 
    *  SRTCP decryption is performed as in Section 4, but only if the E
       flag is equal to 1.  If so, the Encrypted Portion is decrypted,
       using the SRTCP index as the index i.  In case the E-flag is 0,
       the payload is simply left unmodified.
 
    *  SRTCP replay protection is as defined in Section 3.3.2, but using
       the SRTCP index as the index i and a separate Replay List that is
       specific to SRTCP.
 
    *  The pre-defined SRTCP authentication tag is specified as in
       Section 4.2, but with the Authenticated Portion of the SRTCP
       packet given in this section (which includes the index).  The
       authentication transform and related parameters (e.g., key size)
       SHALL by default be the same as selected for the protection of the
       associated SRTP stream(s).
 
    *  In the last step of the processing, only the sender needs to
       update the value of the SRTCP index by incrementing it modulo 2^31
       and for security reasons the sender MUST also check the number of
       SRTCP packets processed, see Section 9.2.
 
    Message authentication for RTCP is REQUIRED, as it is the control
    protocol (e.g., it has a BYE packet) for RTP.
 
    Precautions must be taken so that the packet expansion in SRTCP (due
    to the added fields) does not cause SRTCP messages to use more than
    their share of RTCP bandwidth.  To avoid this, the following two
    measures MUST be taken:
 
    1. When initializing the RTCP variable "avg_rtcp_size" defined in
       chapter 6.3 of [RFC3550], it MUST include the size of the fields
       that will be added by SRTCP (index, E-bit, authentication tag, and
       when present, the MKI).
 
    2. When updating the "avg_rtcp_size" using the variable "packet_size"
       (section 6.3.3 of [RFC3550]), the value of "packet_size" MUST
       include the size of the additional fields added by SRTCP.
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    With these measures in place the SRTCP messages will not use more
    than the allotted bandwidth.  The effect of the size of the added
    fields on the SRTCP traffic will be that messages will be sent with
    longer packet intervals.  The increase in the intervals will be
    directly proportional to size of the added fields.  For the pre-
    defined transforms, the size of the added fields will be at least 14
    octets, and upper bounded depending on MKI and the authentication tag
    sizes.
 
 4.  Pre-Defined Cryptographic Transforms
 
    While there are numerous encryption and message authentication
    algorithms that can be used in SRTP, below we define default
    algorithms in order to avoid the complexity of specifying the
    encodings for the signaling of algorithm and parameter identifiers.
    The defined algorithms have been chosen as they fulfill the goals
    listed in Section 2.  Recommendations on how to extend SRTP with new
    transforms are given in Section 6.
 
 4.1.  Encryption
 
    The following parameters are common to both pre-defined, non-NULL,
    encryption transforms specified in this section.
 
    *  BLOCK_CIPHER-MODE indicates the block cipher used and its mode of
       operation
    *  n_b is the bit-size of the block for the block cipher
    *  k_e is the session encryption key
    *  n_e is the bit-length of k_e
    *  k_s is the session salting key
    *  n_s is the bit-length of k_s
    *  SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH is the octet length of the keystream prefix, a
       non-negative integer, specified by the message authentication code
       in use.
 
    The distinct session keys and salts for SRTP/SRTCP are by default
    derived as specified in Section 4.3.
 
    The encryption transforms defined in SRTP map the SRTP packet index
    and secret key into a pseudo-random keystream segment.  Each
    keystream segment encrypts a single RTP packet.  The process of
    encrypting a packet consists of generating the keystream segment
    corresponding to the packet, and then bitwise exclusive-oring that
    keystream segment onto the payload of the RTP packet to produce the
    Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet.  In case the payload size is
    not an integer multiple of n_b bits, the excess (least significant)
    bits of the keystream are simply discarded.  Decryption is done the
    same way, but swapping the roles of the plaintext and ciphertext.
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    +----+   +------------------+---------------------------------+
    | KG |-->| Keystream Prefix |          Keystream Suffix       |---+
    +----+   +------------------+---------------------------------+   |
                                                                      |
                                +---------------------------------+   v
                                |     Payload of RTP Packet       |->(*)
                                +---------------------------------+   |
                                                                      |
                                +---------------------------------+   |
                                | Encrypted Portion of SRTP Packet|<--+
                                +---------------------------------+
 
    Figure 3: Default SRTP Encryption Processing.  Here KG denotes the
    keystream generator, and (*) denotes bitwise exclusive-or.
 
    The definition of how the keystream is generated, given the index,
    depends on the cipher and its mode of operation.  Below, two such
    keystream generators are defined.  The NULL cipher is also defined,
    to be used when encryption of RTP is not required.
 
    The SRTP definition of the keystream is illustrated in Figure 3.  The
    initial octets of each keystream segment MAY be reserved for use in a
    message authentication code, in which case the keystream used for
    encryption starts immediately after the last reserved octet.  The
    initial reserved octets are called the "keystream prefix" (not to be
    confused with the "encryption prefix" of [RFC3550, Section 6.1]), and
    the remaining octets are called the "keystream suffix".  The
    keystream prefix MUST NOT be used for encryption.  The process is
    illustrated in Figure 3.
 
    The number of octets in the keystream prefix is denoted as
    SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH.  The keystream prefix is indicated by a positive,
    non-zero value of SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH.  This means that, even if
    confidentiality is not to be provided, the keystream generator output
    may still need to be computed for packet authentication, in which
    case the default keystream generator (mode) SHALL be used.
 
    The default cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES],
    and we define two modes of running AES, (1) Segmented Integer Counter
    Mode AES and (2) AES in f8-mode.  In the remainder of this section,
    let E(k,x) be AES applied to key k and input block x.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Baugher, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 20] 
 RFC 3711                          SRTP                        March 2004
 
 
 4.1.1.  AES in Counter Mode
 
    Conceptually, counter mode [AES-CTR] consists of encrypting
    successive integers.  The actual definition is somewhat more
    complicated, in order to randomize the starting point of the integer
    sequence.  Each packet is encrypted with a distinct keystream
    segment, which SHALL be computed as follows.
 
    A keystream segment SHALL be the concatenation of the 128-bit output
    blocks of the AES cipher in the encrypt direction, using key k = k_e,
    in which the block indices are in increasing order.  Symbolically,
    each keystream segment looks like
 
       E(k, IV) || E(k, IV + 1 mod 2^128) || E(k, IV + 2 mod 2^128) ...
 
    where the 128-bit integer value IV SHALL be defined by the SSRC, the
    SRTP packet index i, and the SRTP session salting key k_s, as below.
 
       IV = (k_s * 2^16) XOR (SSRC * 2^64) XOR (i * 2^16)
 
    Each of the three terms in the XOR-sum above is padded with as many
    leading zeros as needed to make the operation well-defined,
    considered as a 128-bit value.
 
    The inclusion of the SSRC allows the use of the same key to protect
    distinct SRTP streams within the same RTP session, see the security
    caveats in Section 9.1.
 
    In the case of SRTCP, the SSRC of the first header of the compound
    packet MUST be used, i SHALL be the 31-bit SRTCP index and k_e, k_s
    SHALL be replaced by the SRTCP encryption session key and salt.
 
    Note that the initial value, IV, is fixed for each packet and is
    formed by "reserving" 16 zeros in the least significant bits for the
    purpose of the counter.  The number of blocks of keystream generated
    for any fixed value of IV MUST NOT exceed 2^16 to avoid keystream
    re-use, see below.  The AES has a block size of 128 bits, so 2^16
    output blocks are sufficient to generate the 2^23 bits of keystream
    needed to encrypt the largest possible RTP packet (except for IPv6
    "jumbograms" [RFC2675], which are not likely to be used for RTP-based
    multimedia traffic).  This restriction on the maximum bit-size of the
    packet that can be encrypted ensures the security of the encryption
    method by limiting the effectiveness of probabilistic attacks [BDJR].
 
    For a particular Counter Mode key, each IV value used as an input
    MUST be distinct, in order to avoid the security exposure of a two-
    time pad situation (Section 9.1).  To satisfy this constraint, an
    implementation MUST ensure that the combination of the SRTP packet
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    index of ROC || SEQ, and the SSRC used in the construction of the IV
    are distinct for any particular key.  The failure to ensure this
    uniqueness could be catastrophic for Secure RTP.  This is in contrast
    to the situation for RTP itself, which may be able to tolerate such
    failures.  It is RECOMMENDED that, if a dedicated security module is
    present, the RTP sequence numbers and SSRC either be generated or
    checked by that module (i.e., sequence-number and SSRC processing in
    an SRTP system needs to be protected as well as the key).
 
 4.1.2.  AES in f8-mode
 
    To encrypt UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, as 3G
    networks) data, a solution (see [f8-a] [f8-b]) known as the f8-
    algorithm has been developed.  On a high level, the proposed scheme
    is a variant of Output Feedback Mode (OFB) [HAC], with a more
    elaborate initialization and feedback function.  As in normal OFB,
    the core consists of a block cipher.  We also define here the use of
    AES as a block cipher to be used in what we shall call "f8-mode of
    operation" RTP encryption.  The AES f8-mode SHALL use the same
    default sizes for session key and salt as AES counter mode.
 
    Figure 4 shows the structure of block cipher, E, running in f8-mode.
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                     IV
                     |
                     v
                 +------+
                 |      |
            +--->|  E   |
            |    +------+
            |        |
      m -> (*)       +-----------+-------------+--  ...     ------+
            |    IV’ |           |             |                  |
            |        |   j=1 -> (*)    j=2 -> (*)   ...  j=L-1 ->(*)
            |        |           |             |                  |
            |        |      +-> (*)       +-> (*)   ...      +-> (*)
            |        |      |    |        |    |             |    |
            |        v      |    v        |    v             |    v
            |    +------+   | +------+    | +------+         | +------+
     k_e ---+--->|  E   |   | |  E   |    | |  E   |         | |  E   |
                 |      |   | |      |    | |      |         | |      |
                 +------+   | +------+    | +------+         | +------+
                     |      |    |        |    |             |    |
                     +------+    +--------+    +--  ...  ----+    |
                     |           |             |                  |
                     v           v             v                  v
                    S(0)        S(1)          S(2)  . . .       S(L-1)
 
    Figure 4.  f8-mode of operation (asterisk, (*), denotes bitwise XOR).
    The figure represents the KG in Figure 3, when AES-f8 is used.
 
 4.1.2.1.  f8 Keystream Generation
 
    The Initialization Vector (IV) SHALL be determined as described in
    Section 4.1.2.2 (and in Section 4.1.2.3 for SRTCP).
 
    Let IV’, S(j), and m denote n_b-bit blocks.  The keystream,
    S(0) ||... || S(L-1), for an N-bit message SHALL be defined by
    setting IV’ = E(k_e XOR m, IV), and S(-1) = 00..0.  For
    j = 0,1,..,L-1 where L = N/n_b (rounded up to nearest integer if it
    is not already an integer) compute
 
             S(j) = E(k_e, IV’ XOR j XOR S(j-1))
 
    Notice that the IV is not used directly.  Instead it is fed through E
    under another key to produce an internal, "masked" value (denoted
    IV’) to prevent an attacker from gaining known input/output pairs.
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    The role of the internal counter, j, is to prevent short keystream
    cycles.  The value of the key mask m SHALL be
 
            m = k_s || 0x555..5,
 
    i.e., the session salting key, appended by the binary pattern 0101..
    to fill out the entire desired key size, n_e.
 
    The sender SHOULD NOT generate more than 2^32 blocks, which is
    sufficient to generate 2^39 bits of keystream.  Unlike counter mode,
    there is no absolute threshold above (below) which f8 is guaranteed
    to be insecure (secure).  The above bound has been chosen to limit,
    with sufficient security margin, the probability of degenerative
    behavior in the f8 keystream generation.
 
 4.1.2.2.  f8 SRTP IV Formation
 
    The purpose of the following IV formation is to provide a feature
    which we call implicit header authentication (IHA), see Section 9.5.
 
    The SRTP IV for 128-bit block AES-f8 SHALL be formed in the following
    way:
 
         IV = 0x00 || M || PT || SEQ || TS || SSRC || ROC
 
    M, PT, SEQ, TS, SSRC SHALL be taken from the RTP header; ROC is from
    the cryptographic context.
 
    The presence of the SSRC as part of the IV allows AES-f8 to be used
    when a master key is shared between multiple streams within the same
    RTP session, see Section 9.1.
 
 4.1.2.3.  f8 SRTCP IV Formation
 
    The SRTCP IV for 128-bit block AES-f8 SHALL be formed in the
    following way:
 
    IV= 0..0 || E || SRTCP index || V || P || RC || PT || length || SSRC
 
    where V, P, RC, PT, length, SSRC SHALL be taken from the first header
    in the RTCP compound packet.  E and SRTCP index are the 1-bit and
    31-bit fields added to the packet.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Baugher, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 24] 
 RFC 3711                          SRTP                        March 2004
 
 
 4.1.3.  NULL Cipher
 
    The NULL cipher is used when no confidentiality for RTP/RTCP is
    requested.  The keystream can be thought of as "000..0", i.e., the
    encryption SHALL simply copy the plaintext input into the ciphertext
    output.
 
 4.2.  Message Authentication and Integrity
 
    Throughout this section, M will denote data to be integrity
    protected.  In the case of SRTP, M SHALL consist of the Authenticated
    Portion of the packet (as specified in Figure 1) concatenated with
    the ROC, M = Authenticated Portion || ROC; in the case of SRTCP, M
    SHALL consist of the Authenticated Portion (as specified in Figure 2)
    only.
 
    Common parameters:
 
    *  AUTH_ALG is the authentication algorithm
    *  k_a is the session message authentication key
    *  n_a is the bit-length of the authentication key
    *  n_tag is the bit-length of the output authentication tag
    *  SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH is the octet length of the keystream prefix as
       defined above, a parameter of AUTH_ALG
 
    The distinct session authentication keys for SRTP/SRTCP are by
    default derived as specified in Section 4.3.
 
    The values of n_a, n_tag, and SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH MUST be fixed for
    any particular fixed value of the key.
 
    We describe the process of computing authentication tags as follows.
    The sender computes the tag of M and appends it to the packet.  The
    SRTP receiver verifies a message/authentication tag pair by computing
    a new authentication tag over M using the selected algorithm and key,
    and then compares it to the tag associated with the received message.
    If the two tags are equal, then the message/tag pair is valid;
    otherwise, it is invalid and the error audit message "AUTHENTICATION
    FAILURE" MUST be returned.
 
 4.2.1.  HMAC-SHA1
 
    The pre-defined authentication transform for SRTP is HMAC-SHA1
    [RFC2104].  With HMAC-SHA1, the SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH (Figure 3) SHALL
    be 0.  For SRTP (respectively SRTCP), the HMAC SHALL be applied to
    the session authentication key and M as specified above, i.e.,
    HMAC(k_a, M).  The HMAC output SHALL then be truncated to the n_tag
    left-most bits.
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 4.3.  Key Derivation
 
 4.3.1.  Key Derivation Algorithm
 
    Regardless of the encryption or message authentication transform that
    is employed (it may be an SRTP pre-defined transform or newly
    introduced according to Section 6), interoperable SRTP
    implementations MUST use the SRTP key derivation to generate session
    keys.  Once the key derivation rate is properly signaled at the start
    of the session, there is no need for extra communication between the
    parties that use SRTP key derivation.
 
                          packet index ---+
                                          |
                                          v
                +-----------+ master  +--------+ session encr_key
                | ext       | key     |        |---------->
                | key mgmt  |-------->|  key   | session auth_key
                | (optional |         | deriv  |---------->
                | rekey)    |-------->|        | session salt_key
                |           | master  |        |---------->
                +-----------+ salt    +--------+
 
    Figure 5: SRTP key derivation.
 
    At least one initial key derivation SHALL be performed by SRTP, i.e.,
    the first key derivation is REQUIRED.  Further applications of the
    key derivation MAY be performed, according to the
    "key_derivation_rate" value in the cryptographic context.  The key
    derivation function SHALL initially be invoked before the first
    packet and then, when r > 0, a key derivation is performed whenever
    index mod r equals zero.  This can be thought of as "refreshing" the
    session keys.  The value of "key_derivation_rate" MUST be kept fixed
    for the lifetime of the associated master key.
 
    Interoperable SRTP implementations MAY also derive session salting
    keys for encryption transforms, as is done in both of the pre-
    defined transforms.
 
    Let m and n be positive integers.  A pseudo-random function family is
    a set of keyed functions {PRF_n(k,x)} such that for the (secret)
    random key k, given m-bit x, PRF_n(k,x) is an n-bit string,
    computationally indistinguishable from random n-bit strings, see
    [HAC].  For the purpose of key derivation in SRTP, a secure PRF with
    m = 128 (or more) MUST be used, and a default PRF transform is
    defined in Section 4.3.3.
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    Let "a DIV t" denote integer division of a by t, rounded down, and
    with the convention that "a DIV 0 = 0" for all a.  We also make the
    convention of treating "a DIV t" as a bit string of the same length
    as a, and thus "a DIV t" will in general have leading zeros.
 
    Key derivation SHALL be defined as follows in terms of <label>, an
    8-bit constant (see below), master_salt and key_derivation_rate, as
    determined in the cryptographic context, and index, the packet index
    (i.e., the 48-bit ROC || SEQ for SRTP):
 
    *  Let r = index DIV key_derivation_rate (with DIV as defined above).
 
    *  Let key_id = <label> || r.
 
    *  Let x = key_id XOR master_salt, where key_id and master_salt are
       aligned so that their least significant bits agree (right-
       alignment).
 
    <label> MUST be unique for each type of key to be derived.  We
    currently define <label> 0x00 to 0x05 (see below), and future
    extensions MAY specify new values in the range 0x06 to 0xff for other
    purposes.  The n-bit SRTP key (or salt) for this packet SHALL then be
    derived from the master key, k_master as follows:
 
       PRF_n(k_master, x).
 
    (The PRF may internally specify additional formatting and padding of
    x, see e.g., Section 4.3.3 for the default PRF.)
 
    The session keys and salt SHALL now be derived using:
 
    - k_e (SRTP encryption): <label> = 0x00, n = n_e.
 
    - k_a (SRTP message authentication): <label> = 0x01, n = n_a.
 
    - k_s (SRTP salting key): <label> = 0x02, n = n_s.
 
    where n_e, n_s, and n_a are from the cryptographic context.
 
    The master key and master salt MUST be random, but the master salt
    MAY be public.
 
    Note that for a key_derivation_rate of 0, the application of the key
    derivation SHALL take place exactly once.
 
    The definition of DIV above is purely for notational convenience.
    For a non-zero t among the set of allowed key derivation rates, "a
    DIV t" can be implemented as a right-shift by the base-2 logarithm of
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    t.  The derivation operation is further facilitated if the rates are
    chosen to be powers of 256, but that granularity was considered too
    coarse to be a requirement of this specification.
 
    The upper limit on the number of packets that can be secured using
    the same master key (see Section 9.2) is independent of the key
    derivation.
 
 4.3.2.  SRTCP Key Derivation
 
    SRTCP SHALL by default use the same master key (and master salt) as
    SRTP.  To do this securely, the following changes SHALL be done to
    the definitions in Section 4.3.1 when applying session key derivation
    for SRTCP.
 
    Replace the SRTP index by the 32-bit quantity: 0 || SRTCP index
    (i.e., excluding the E-bit, replacing it with a fixed 0-bit), and use
    <label> = 0x03 for the SRTCP encryption key, <label> = 0x04 for the
    SRTCP authentication key, and, <label> = 0x05 for the SRTCP salting
    key.
 
 4.3.3.  AES-CM PRF
 
    The currently defined PRF, keyed by 128, 192, or 256 bit master key,
    has input block size m = 128 and can produce n-bit outputs for n up
    to 2^23.  PRF_n(k_master,x) SHALL be AES in Counter Mode as described
    in Section 4.1.1, applied to key k_master, and IV equal to (x*2^16),
    and with the output keystream truncated to the n first (left-most)
    bits.  (Requiring n/128, rounded up, applications of AES.)
 
 5.  Default and mandatory-to-implement Transforms
 
    The default transforms also are mandatory-to-implement transforms in
    SRTP.  Of course, "mandatory-to-implement" does not imply
    "mandatory-to-use".  Table 1 summarizes the pre-defined transforms.
    The default values below are valid for the pre-defined transforms.
 
                          mandatory-to-impl.   optional     default
 
    encryption            AES-CM, NULL         AES-f8       AES-CM
    message integrity     HMAC-SHA1              -          HMAC-SHA1
    key derivation (PRF)  AES-CM                 -          AES-CM
 
    Table 1: Mandatory-to-implement, optional and default transforms in
    SRTP and SRTCP.
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 5.1.  Encryption: AES-CM and NULL
 
    AES running in Segmented Integer Counter Mode, as defined in Section
    4.1.1, SHALL be the default encryption algorithm.  The default key
    lengths SHALL be 128-bit for the session encryption key (n_e).  The
    default session salt key-length (n_s) SHALL be 112 bits.
 
    The NULL cipher SHALL also be mandatory-to-implement.
 
 5.2.  Message Authentication/Integrity: HMAC-SHA1
 
    HMAC-SHA1, as defined in Section 4.2.1, SHALL be the default message
    authentication code.  The default session authentication key-length
    (n_a) SHALL be 160 bits, the default authentication tag length
    (n_tag) SHALL be 80 bits, and the SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH SHALL be zero
    for HMAC-SHA1.  In addition, for SRTCP, the pre-defined HMAC-SHA1
    MUST NOT be applied with a value of n_tag, nor n_a, that are smaller
    than these defaults.  For SRTP, smaller values are NOT RECOMMENDED,
    but MAY be used after careful consideration of the issues in Section
    7.5 and 9.5.
 
 5.3.  Key Derivation: AES-CM PRF
 
    The AES Counter Mode based key derivation and PRF defined in Sections
    4.3.1 to 4.3.3, using a 128-bit master key, SHALL be the default
    method for generating session keys.  The default master salt length
    SHALL be 112 bits and the default key-derivation rate SHALL be zero.
 
 6.  Adding SRTP Transforms
 
    Section 4 provides examples of the level of detail needed for
    defining transforms.  Whenever a new transform is to be added to
    SRTP, a companion standard track RFC MUST be written to exactly
    define how the new transform can be used with SRTP (and SRTCP).  Such
    a companion RFC SHOULD avoid overlap with the SRTP protocol document.
    Note however, that it MAY be necessary to extend the SRTP or SRTCP
    cryptographic context definition with new parameters (including fixed
    or default values), add steps to the packet processing, or even add
    fields to the SRTP/SRTCP packets.  The companion RFC SHALL explain
    any known issues regarding interactions between the transform and
    other aspects of SRTP.
 
    Each new transform document SHOULD specify its key attributes, e.g.,
    size of keys (minimum, maximum, recommended), format of keys,
    recommended/required processing of input keying material,
    requirements/recommendations on key lifetime, re-keying and key
    derivation, whether sharing of keys between SRTP and SRTCP is allowed
    or not, etc.
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    An added message integrity transform SHOULD define a minimum
    acceptable key/tag size for SRTCP, equivalent in strength to the
    minimum values as defined in Section 5.2.
 
 7.  Rationale
 
    This section explains the rationale behind several important features
    of SRTP.
 
 7.1.  Key derivation
 
    Key derivation reduces the burden on the key establishment.  As many
    as six different keys are needed per crypto context (SRTP and SRTCP
    encryption keys and salts, SRTP and SRTCP authentication keys), but
    these are derived from a single master key in a cryptographically
    secure way.  Thus, the key management protocol needs to exchange only
    one master key (plus master salt when required), and then SRTP itself
    derives all the necessary session keys (via the first, mandatory
    application of the key derivation function).
 
    Multiple applications of the key derivation function are optional,
    but will give security benefits when enabled.  They prevent an
    attacker from obtaining large amounts of ciphertext produced by a
    single fixed session key.  If the attacker was able to collect a
    large amount of ciphertext for a certain session key, he might be
    helped in mounting certain attacks.
 
    Multiple applications of the key derivation function provide
    backwards and forward security in the sense that a compromised
    session key does not compromise other session keys derived from the
    same master key.  This means that the attacker who is able to recover
    a certain session key, is anyway not able to have access to messages
    secured under previous and later session keys (derived from the same
    master key).  (Note that, of course, a leaked master key reveals all
    the session keys derived from it.)
 
    Considerations arise with high-rate key refresh, especially in large
    multicast settings, see Section 11.
 
 7.2.  Salting key
 
    The master salt guarantees security against off-line key-collision
    attacks on the key derivation that might otherwise reduce the
    effective key size [MF00].
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    The derived session salting key used in the encryption, has been
    introduced to protect against some attacks on additive stream
    ciphers, see Section 9.2.  The explicit inclusion method of the salt
    in the IV has been selected for ease of hardware implementation.
 
 7.3.  Message Integrity from Universal Hashing
 
    The particular definition of the keystream given in Section 4.1 (the
    keystream prefix) is to give provision for particular universal hash
    functions, suitable for message authentication in the Wegman-Carter
    paradigm [WC81].  Such functions are provably secure, simple, quick,
    and especially appropriate for Digital Signal Processors and other
    processors with a fast multiply operation.
 
    No authentication transforms are currently provided in SRTP other
    than HMAC-SHA1.  Future transforms, like the above mentioned
    universal hash functions, MAY be added following the guidelines in
    Section 6.
 
 7.4.  Data Origin Authentication Considerations
 
    Note that in pair-wise communications, integrity and data origin
    authentication are provided together.  However, in group scenarios
    where the keys are shared between members, the MAC tag only proves
    that a member of the group sent the packet, but does not prevent
    against a member impersonating another.  Data origin authentication
    (DOA) for multicast and group RTP sessions is a hard problem that
    needs a solution; while some promising proposals are being
    investigated [PCST1] [PCST2], more work is needed to rigorously
    specify these technologies.  Thus SRTP data origin authentication in
    groups is for further study.
 
    DOA can be done otherwise using signatures.  However, this has high
    impact in terms of bandwidth and processing time, therefore we do not
    offer this form of authentication in the pre-defined packet-integrity
    transform.
 
    The presence of mixers and translators does not allow data origin
    authentication in case the RTP payload and/or the RTP header are
    manipulated.  Note that these types of middle entities also disrupt
    end-to-end confidentiality (as the IV formation depends e.g., on the
    RTP header preservation).  A certain trust model may choose to trust
    the mixers/translators to decrypt/re-encrypt the media (this would
    imply breaking the end-to-end security, with related security
    implications).
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 7.5.  Short and Zero-length Message Authentication
 
    As shown in Figure 1, the authentication tag is RECOMMENDED in SRTP.
    A full 80-bit authentication-tag SHOULD be used, but a shorter tag or
    even a zero-length tag (i.e., no message authentication) MAY be used
    under certain conditions to support either of the following two
    application environments.
 
       1. Strong authentication can be impractical in environments where
          bandwidth preservation is imperative.  An important special
          case is wireless communication systems, in which bandwidth is a
          scarce and expensive resource.  Studies have shown that for
          certain applications and link technologies, additional bytes
          may result in a significant decrease in spectrum efficiency
          [SWO].  Considerable effort has been made to design IP header
          compression techniques to improve spectrum efficiency
          [RFC3095].  A typical voice application produces 20 byte
          samples, and the RTP, UDP and IP headers need to be jointly
          compressed to one or two bytes on average in order to obtain
          acceptable wireless bandwidth economy [RFC3095].  In this case,
          strong authentication would impose nearly fifty percent
          overhead.
 
       2. Authentication is impractical for applications that use data
          links with fixed-width fields that cannot accommodate the
          expansion due to the authentication tag.  This is the case for
          some important existing wireless channels.  For example, zero-
          byte header compression is used to adapt EVRC/SMV voice with
          the legacy IS-95 bearer channel in CDMA2000 VoIP services.  It
          was found that not a single additional octet could be added to
          the data, which motivated the creation of a zero-byte profile
          for ROHC [RFC3242].
 
    A short tag is secure for a restricted set of applications.  Consider
    a voice telephony application, for example, such as a G.729 audio
    codec with a 20-millisecond packetization interval, protected by a
    32-bit message authentication tag.  The likelihood of any given
    packet being successfully forged is only one in 2^32.  Thus an
    adversary can control no more than 20 milliseconds of audio output
    during a 994-day period, on average.  In contrast, the effect of a
    single forged packet can be much larger if the application is
    stateful.  A codec that uses relative or predictive compression
    across packets will propagate the maliciously generated state,
    affecting a longer duration of output.
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    Certainly not all SRTP or telephony applications meet the criteria
    for short or zero-length authentication tags.  Section 9.5.1
    discusses the risks of weak or no message authentication, and section
    9.5 describes the circumstances when it is acceptable and when it is
    unacceptable.
 
 8.  Key Management Considerations
 
    There are emerging key management standards [MIKEY] [KEYMGT] [SDMS]
    for establishing an SRTP cryptographic context (e.g., an SRTP master
    key).  Both proprietary and open-standard key management methods are
    likely to be used for telephony applications [MIKEY] [KINK] and
    multicast applications [GDOI].  This section provides guidance for
    key management systems that service SRTP session.
 
    For initialization, an interoperable SRTP implementation SHOULD be
    given the SSRC and MAY be given the initial RTP sequence number for
    the RTP stream by key management (thus, key management has a
    dependency on RTP operational parameters).  Sending the RTP sequence
    number in the key management may be useful e.g., when the initial
    sequence number is close to wrapping (to avoid synchronization
    problems), and to communicate the current sequence number to a
    joining endpoint (to properly initialize its replay list).
 
    If the pre-defined transforms are used, SRTP allows sharing of the
    same master key between SRTP/SRTCP streams belonging to the same RTP
    session.
 
    First, sharing between SRTP streams belonging to the same RTP session
    is secure if the design of the synchronization mechanism, i.e., the
    IV, avoids keystream re-use (the two-time pad, Section 9.1).  This is
    taken care of by the fact that RTP provides for unique SSRCs for
    streams belonging to the same RTP session.  See Section 9.1 for
    further discussion.
 
    Second, sharing between SRTP and the corresponding SRTCP is secure.
    The fact that an SRTP stream and its associated SRTCP stream both
    carry the same SSRC does not constitute a problem for the two-time
    pad due to the key derivation.  Thus, SRTP and SRTCP corresponding to
    one RTP session MAY share master keys (as they do by default).
 
    Note that message authentication also has a dependency on SSRC
    uniqueness that is unrelated to the problem of keystream reuse: SRTP
    streams authenticated under the same key MUST have a distinct SSRC in
    order to identify the sender of the message.  This requirement is
    needed because the SSRC is the cryptographically authenticated field
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    used to distinguish between different SRTP streams.  Were two streams
    to use identical SSRC values, then an adversary could substitute
    messages from one stream into the other without detection.
 
    SRTP/SRTCP MUST NOT share master keys under any other circumstances
    than the ones given above, i.e., between SRTP and its corresponding
    SRTCP, and, between streams belonging to the same RTP session.
 
 8.1.  Re-keying
 
    The recommended way for a particular key management system to provide
    re-key within SRTP is by associating a master key in a crypto context
    with an MKI.
 
    This provides for easy master key retrieval (see Scenarios in Section
    11), but has the disadvantage of adding extra bits to each packet.
    As noted in Section 7.5, some wireless links do not cater for added
    bits, therefore SRTP also defines a more economic way of triggering
    re-keying, via use of <From, To>, which works in some specific,
    simple scenarios (see Section 8.1.1).
 
    SRTP senders SHALL count the amount of SRTP and SRTCP traffic being
    used for a master key and invoke key management to re-key if needed
    (Section 9.2).  These interactions are defined by the key management
    interface to SRTP and are not defined by this protocol specification.
 
 8.1.1.  Use of the <From, To> for re-keying
 
    In addition to the use of the MKI, SRTP defines another optional
    mechanism for master key retrieval, the <From, To>.  The <From, To>
    specifies the range of SRTP indices (a pair of sequence number and
    ROC) within which a certain master key is valid, and is (when used)
    part of the crypto context.  By looking at the 48-bit SRTP index of
    the current SRTP packet, the corresponding master key can be found by
    determining which From-To interval it belongs to.  For SRTCP, the
    most recently observed/used SRTP index (which can be obtained from
    the cryptographic context) is used for this purpose, even though
    SRTCP has its own (31-bit) index (see caveat below).
 
    This method, compared to the MKI, has the advantage of identifying
    the master key and defining its lifetime without adding extra bits to
    each packet.  This could be useful, as already noted, for some
    wireless links that do not cater for added bits.  However, its use
    SHOULD be limited to specific, very simple scenarios.  We recommend
    to limit its use when the RTP session is a simple unidirectional or
    bi-directional stream.  This is because in case of multiple streams,
    it is difficult to trigger the re-key based on the <From, To> of a
    single RTP stream. For example, if several streams share a master
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    key, there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between the index
    sequence space of a certain stream, and the index sequence space on
    which the <From, To> values are based.  Consequently, when a master
    key is shared between streams, one of these streams MUST be
    designated by key management as the one whose index space defines the
    re-keying points.  Also, the re-key triggering on SRTCP is based on
    the correspondent SRTP stream, i.e., when the SRTP stream changes the
    master key, so does the correspondent SRTCP.  This becomes obviously
    more and more complex with multiple streams.
 
    The default values for the <From, To> are "from the first observed
    packet" and "until further notice".  However, the maximum limit of
    SRTP/SRTCP packets that are sent under each given master/session key
    (Section 9.2) MUST NOT be exceeded.
 
    In case the <From, To> is used as key retrieval, then the MKI is not
    inserted in the packet (and its indicator in the crypto context is
    zero).  However, using the MKI does not exclude using <From, To> key
    lifetime simultaneously.  This can for instance be useful to signal
    at the sender side at which point in time an MKI is to be made
    active.
 
 8.2.  Key Management parameters
 
    The table below lists all SRTP parameters that key management can
    supply.  For reference, it also provides a summary of the default and
    mandatory-to-support values for an SRTP implementation as described
    in Section 5.
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    Parameter                     Mandatory-to-support    Default
    ---------                     --------------------    -------
 
    SRTP and SRTCP encr transf.       AES_CM, NULL         AES_CM
    (Other possible values: AES_f8)
 
    SRTP and SRTCP auth transf.       HMAC-SHA1           HMAC-SHA1
 
    SRTP and SRTCP auth params:
      n_tag (tag length)                 80                 80
      SRTP prefix_length                  0                  0
 
    Key derivation PRF                 AES_CM              AES_CM
 
    Key material params
    (for each master key):
      master key length                 128                128
      n_e (encr session key length)     128                128
      n_a (auth session key length)     160                160
      master salt key
      length of the master salt         112                112
      n_s (session salt key length)     112                112
      key derivation rate                 0                  0
 
      key lifetime
         SRTP-packets-max-lifetime      2^48               2^48
         SRTCP-packets-max-lifetime     2^31               2^31
         from-to-lifetime <From, To>
      MKI indicator                       0                 0
      length of the MKI                   0                 0
      value of the MKI
 
    Crypto context index params:
      SSRC value
      ROC
      SEQ
      SRTCP Index
      Transport address
      Port number
 
    Relation to other RTP profiles:
      sender’s order between FEC and SRTP FEC-SRTP      FEC-SRTP
      (see Section 10)
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 9. Security Considerations
 
 9.1.  SSRC collision and two-time pad
 
    Any fixed keystream output, generated from the same key and index
    MUST only be used to encrypt once.  Re-using such keystream (jokingly
    called a "two-time pad" system by cryptographers), can seriously
    compromise security.  The NSA’s VENONA project [C99] provides a
    historical example of such a compromise.  It is REQUIRED that
    automatic key management be used for establishing and maintaining
    SRTP and SRTCP keying material; this requirement is to avoid
    keystream reuse, which is more likely to occur with manual key
    management.  Furthermore, in SRTP, a "two-time pad" is avoided by
    requiring the key, or some other parameter of cryptographic
    significance, to be unique per RTP/RTCP stream and packet.  The pre-
    defined SRTP transforms accomplish packet-uniqueness by including the
    packet index and stream-uniqueness by inclusion of the SSRC.
 
    The pre-defined transforms (AES-CM and AES-f8) allow master keys to
    be shared across streams belonging to the same RTP session by the
    inclusion of the SSRC in the IV.  A master key MUST NOT be shared
    among different RTP sessions.
 
    Thus, the SSRC MUST be unique between all the RTP streams within the
    same RTP session that share the same master key.  RTP itself provides
    an algorithm for detecting SSRC collisions within the same RTP
    session.  Thus, temporary collisions could lead to temporary two-time
    pad, in the unfortunate event that SSRCs collide at a point in time
    when the streams also have identical sequence numbers (occurring with
    probability roughly 2^(-48)).  Therefore, the key management SHOULD
    take care of avoiding such SSRC collisions by including the SSRCs to
    be used in the session as negotiation parameters, proactively
    assuring their uniqueness.  This is a strong requirements in
    scenarios where for example, there are multiple senders that can
    start to transmit simultaneously, before SSRC collision are detected
    at the RTP level.
 
    Note also that even with distinct SSRCs, extensive use of the same
    key might improve chances of probabilistic collision and time-
    memory-tradeoff attacks succeeding.
 
    As described, master keys MAY be shared between streams belonging to
    the same RTP session, but it is RECOMMENDED that each SSRC have its
    own master key.  When master keys are shared among SSRC participants
    and SSRCs are managed by a key management module as recommended
    above, the RECOMMENDED policy for an SSRC collision error is for the
    participant to leave the SRTP session as it is a sign of malfunction.
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 9.2.  Key Usage
 
    The effective key size is determined (upper bounded) by the size of
    the master key and, for encryption, the size of the salting key.  Any
    additive stream cipher is vulnerable to attacks that use statistical
    knowledge about the plaintext source to enable key collision and
    time-memory tradeoff attacks [MF00] [H80] [BS00].  These attacks take
    advantage of commonalities among plaintexts, and provide a way for a
    cryptanalyst to amortize the computational effort of decryption over
    many keys, or over many bytes of output, thus reducing the effective
    key size of the cipher.  A detailed analysis of these attacks and
    their applicability to the encryption of Internet traffic is provided
    in [MF00].  In summary, the effective key size of SRTP when used in a
    security system in which m distinct keys are used, is equal to the
    key size of the cipher less the logarithm (base two) of m.
    Protection against such attacks can be provided simply by increasing
    the size of the keys used, which here can be accomplished by the use
    of the salting key.  Note that the salting key MUST be random but MAY
    be public.  A salt size of (the suggested) size 112 bits protects
    against attacks in scenarios where at most 2^112 keys are in use.
    This is sufficient for all practical purposes.
 
    Implementations SHOULD use keys that are as large as possible.
    Please note that in many cases increasing the key size of a cipher
    does not affect the throughput of that cipher.
 
    The use of the SRTP and SRTCP indices in the pre-defined transforms
    fixes the maximum number of packets that can be secured with the same
    key.  This limit is fixed to 2^48 SRTP packets for an SRTP stream,
    and 2^31 SRTCP packets, when SRTP and SRTCP are considered
    independently.  Due to for example re-keying, reaching this limit may
    or may not coincide with wrapping of the indices, and thus the sender
    MUST keep packet counts.  However, when the session keys for related
    SRTP and SRTCP streams are derived from the same master key (the
    default behavior, Section 4.3), the upper bound that has to be
    considered is in practice the minimum of the two quantities.  That
    is, when 2^48 SRTP packets or 2^31 SRTCP packets have been secured
    with the same key (whichever occurs before), the key management MUST
    be called to provide new master key(s) (previously stored and used
    keys MUST NOT be used again), or the session MUST be terminated.  If
    a sender of RTCP discovers that the sender of SRTP (or SRTCP) has not
    updated the master or session key prior to sending 2^48 SRTP (or 2^31
    SRTCP) packets belonging to the same SRTP (SRTCP) stream, it is up to
    the security policy of the RTCP sender how to behave, e.g., whether
    an RTCP BYE-packet should be sent and/or if the event should be
    logged.
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    Note: in most typical applications (assuming at least one RTCP packet
    for every 128,000 RTP packets), it will be the SRTCP index that first
    reaches the upper limit, although the time until this occurs is very
    long: even at 200 SRTCP packets/sec, the 2^31 index space of SRTCP is
    enough to secure approximately 4 months of communication.
 
    Note that if the master key is to be shared between SRTP streams
    within the same RTP session (Section 9.1), although the above bounds
    are on a per stream (i.e., per SSRC) basis, the sender MUST base re-
    key decision on the stream whose sequence number space is the first
    to be exhausted.
 
    Key derivation limits the amount of plaintext that is encrypted with
    a fixed session key, and made available to an attacker for analysis,
    but key derivation does not extend the master key’s lifetime.  To see
    this, simply consider our requirements to avoid two-time pad:  two
    distinct packets MUST either be processed with distinct IVs, or with
    distinct session keys, and both the distinctness of IV and of the
    session keys are (for the pre-defined transforms) dependent on the
    distinctness of the packet indices.
 
    Note that with the key derivation, the effective key size is at most
    that of the master key, even if the derived session key is
    considerably longer.  With the pre-defined authentication transform,
    the session authentication key is 160 bits, but the master key by
    default is only 128 bits.  This design choice was made to comply with
    certain recommendations in [RFC2104] so that an existing HMAC
    implementation can be plugged into SRTP without problems.  Since the
    default tag size is 80 bits, it is, for the applications in mind,
    also considered acceptable from security point of view.  Users having
    concerns about this are RECOMMENDED to instead use a 192 bit master
    key in the key derivation.  It was, however, chosen not to mandate
    192-bit keys since existing AES implementations to be used in the
    key-derivation may not always support key-lengths other than 128
    bits.  Since AES is not defined (or properly analyzed) for use with
    160 bit keys it is NOT RECOMMENDED that ad-hoc key-padding schemes
    are used to pad shorter keys to 192 or 256 bits.
 
 9.3.  Confidentiality of the RTP Payload
 
    SRTP’s pre-defined ciphers are "seekable" stream ciphers, i.e.,
    ciphers able to efficiently seek to arbitrary locations in their
    keystream (so that the encryption or decryption of one packet does
    not depend on preceding packets).  By using seekable stream ciphers,
    SRTP avoids the denial of service attacks that are possible on stream
    ciphers that lack this property.  It is important to be aware that,
    as with any stream cipher, the exact length of the payload is
    revealed by the encryption.  This means that it may be possible to
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    deduce certain "formatting bits" of the payload, as the length of the
    codec output might vary due to certain parameter settings etc.  This,
    in turn, implies that the corresponding bit of the keystream can be
    deduced.  However, if the stream cipher is secure (counter mode and
    f8 are provably secure under certain assumptions [BDJR] [KSYH] [IK]),
    knowledge of a few bits of the keystream will not aid an attacker in
    predicting subsequent keystream bits.  Thus, the payload length (and
    information deducible from this) will leak, but nothing else.
 
    As some RTP packet could contain highly predictable data, e.g., SID,
    it is important to use a cipher designed to resist known plaintext
    attacks (which is the current practice).
 
 9.4.  Confidentiality of the RTP Header
 
    In SRTP, RTP headers are sent in the clear to allow for header
    compression.  This means that data such as payload type,
    synchronization source identifier, and timestamp are available to an
    eavesdropper.  Moreover, since RTP allows for future extensions of
    headers, we cannot foresee what kind of possibly sensitive
    information might also be "leaked".
 
    SRTP is a low-cost method, which allows header compression to reduce
    bandwidth.  It is up to the endpoints’ policies to decide about the
    security protocol to employ.  If one really needs to protect headers,
    and is allowed to do so by the surrounding environment, then one
    should also look at alternatives, e.g., IPsec [RFC2401].
 
 9.5.  Integrity of the RTP payload and header
 
    SRTP messages are subject to attacks on their integrity and source
    identification, and these risks are discussed in Section 9.5.1.  To
    protect against these attacks, each SRTP stream SHOULD be protected
    by HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104] with an 80-bit output tag and a 160-bit key,
    or a message authentication code with equivalent strength.  Secure
    RTP SHOULD NOT be used without message authentication, except under
    the circumstances described in this section.  It is important to note
    that encryption algorithms, including AES Counter Mode and f8, do not
    provide message authentication.  SRTCP MUST NOT be used with weak (or
    NULL) authentication.
 
    SRTP MAY be used with weak authentication (e.g., a 32-bit
    authentication tag), or with no authentication (the NULL
    authentication algorithm).  These options allow SRTP to be used to
    provide confidentiality in situations where
 
     * weak or null authentication is an acceptable security risk, and
     * it is impractical to provide strong message authentication.
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    These conditions are described below and in Section 7.5.  Note that
    both conditions MUST hold in order for weak or null authentication to
    be used.  The risks associated with exercising the weak or null
    authentication options need to be considered by a security audit
    prior to their use for a particular application or environment given
    the risks, which are discussed in Section 9.5.1.
 
    Weak authentication is acceptable when the RTP application is such
    that the effect of a small fraction of successful forgeries is
    negligible.  If the application is stateless, then the effect of a
    single forged RTP packet is limited to the decoding of that
    particular packet.  Under this condition, the size of the
    authentication tag MUST ensure that only a negligible fraction of the
    packets passed to the RTP application by the SRTP receiver can be
    forgeries.  This fraction is negligible when an adversary, if given
    control of the forged packets, is not able to make a significant
    impact on the output of the RTP application (see the example of
    Section 7.5).
 
    Weak or null authentication MAY be acceptable when it is unlikely
    that an adversary can modify ciphertext so that it decrypts to an
    intelligible value.  One important case is when it is difficult for
    an adversary to acquire the RTP plaintext data, since for many
    codecs, an adversary that does not know the input signal cannot
    manipulate the output signal in a controlled way.  In many cases it
    may be difficult for the adversary to determine the actual value of
    the plaintext.  For example, a hidden snooping device might be
    required in order to know a live audio or video signal.  The
    adversary’s signal must have a quality equivalent to or greater than
    that of the signal under attack, since otherwise the adversary would
    not have enough information to encode that signal with the codec used
    by the victim.  Plaintext prediction may also be especially difficult
    for an interactive application such as a telephone call.
 
    Weak or null authentication MUST NOT be used when the RTP application
    makes data forwarding or access control decisions based on the RTP
    data.  In such a case, an attacker may be able to subvert
    confidentiality by causing the receiver to forward data to an
    attacker.  See Section 3 of [B96] for a real-life example of such
    attacks.
 
    Null authentication MUST NOT be used when a replay attack, in which
    an adversary stores packets then replays them later in the session,
    could have a non-negligible impact on the receiver.  An example of a
    successful replay attack is the storing of the output of a
    surveillance camera for a period of time, later followed by the
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    injection of that output to the monitoring station to avoid
    surveillance.  Encryption does not protect against this attack, and
    non-null authentication is REQUIRED in order to defeat it.
 
    If existential message forgery is an issue, i.e., when the accuracy
    of the received data is of non-negligible importance, null
    authentication MUST NOT be used.
 
 9.5.1.  Risks of Weak or Null Message Authentication
 
    During a security audit considering the use of weak or null
    authentication, it is important to keep in mind the following attacks
    which are possible when no message authentication algorithm is used.
 
    An attacker who cannot predict the plaintext is still always able to
    modify the message sent between the sender and the receiver so that
    it decrypts to a random plaintext value, or to send a stream of bogus
    packets to the receiver that will decrypt to random plaintext values.
    This attack is essentially a denial of service attack, though in the
    absence of message authentication, the RTP application will have
    inputs that are bit-wise correlated with the true value.  Some
    multimedia codecs and common operating systems will crash when such
    data are accepted as valid video data.  This denial of service attack
    may be a much larger threat than that due to an attacker dropping,
    delaying, or re-ordering packets.
 
    An attacker who cannot predict the plaintext can still replay a
    previous message with certainty that the receiver will accept it.
    Applications with stateless codecs might be robust against this type
    of attack, but for other, more complex applications these attacks may
    be far more grave.
 
    An attacker who can predict the plaintext can modify the ciphertext
    so that it will decrypt to any value of her choosing.  With an
    additive stream cipher, an attacker will always be able to change
    individual bits.
 
    An attacker may be able to subvert confidentiality due to the lack of
    authentication when a data forwarding or access control decision is
    made on decrypted but unauthenticated plaintext.  This is because the
    receiver may be fooled into forwarding data to an attacker, leading
    to an indirect breach of confidentiality (see Section 3 of [B96]).
    This is because data-forwarding decisions are made on the decrypted
    plaintext; information in the plaintext will determine to what subnet
    (or process) the plaintext is forwarded in ESP [RFC2401] tunnel mode
    (respectively, transport mode).  When Secure RTP is used without
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    message authentication, it should be verified that the application
    does not make data forwarding or access control decisions based on
    the decrypted plaintext.
 
    Some cipher modes of operation that require padding, e.g., standard
    cipher block chaining (CBC) are very sensitive to attacks on
    confidentiality if certain padding types are used in the absence of
    integrity.  The attack [V02] shows that this is indeed the case for
    the standard RTP padding as discussed in reference to Figure 1, when
    used together with CBC mode.  Later transform additions to SRTP MUST
    therefore carefully consider the risk of using this padding without
    proper integrity protection.
 
 9.5.2.  Implicit Header Authentication
 
    The IV formation of the f8-mode gives implicit authentication (IHA)
    of the RTP header, even when message authentication is not used.
    When IHA is used, an attacker that modifies the value of the RTP
    header will cause the decryption process at the receiver to produce
    random plaintext values.  While this protection is not equivalent to
    message authentication, it may be useful for some applications.
 
 10.  Interaction with Forward Error Correction mechanisms
 
    The default processing when using Forward Error Correction (e.g., RFC
    2733) processing with SRTP SHALL be to perform FEC processing prior
    to SRTP processing on the sender side and to perform SRTP processing
    prior to FEC processing on the receiver side.  Any change to this
    ordering (reversing it, or, placing FEC between SRTP encryption and
    SRTP authentication) SHALL be signaled out of band.
 
 11.  Scenarios
 
    SRTP can be used as security protocol for the RTP/RTCP traffic in
    many different scenarios.  SRTP has a number of configuration
    options, in particular regarding key usage, and can have impact on
    the total performance of the application according to the way it is
    used.  Hence, the use of SRTP is dependent on the kind of scenario
    and application it is used with.  In the following, we briefly
    illustrate some use cases for SRTP, and give some guidelines for
    recommended setting of its options.
 
 11.1.  Unicast
 
    A typical example would be a voice call or video-on-demand
    application.
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    Consider one bi-directional RTP stream, as one RTP session.  It is
    possible for the two parties to share the same master key in the two
    directions according to the principles of Section 9.1.  The first
    round of the key derivation splits the master key into any or all of
    the following session keys (according to the provided security
    functions):
 
    SRTP_encr_key, SRTP_auth_key, SRTCP_encr_key, and SRTCP_auth key.
 
    (For simplicity, we omit discussion of the salts, which are also
    derived.)  In this scenario, it will in most cases suffice to have a
    single master key with the default lifetime.  This guarantees
    sufficiently long lifetime of the keys and a minimum set of keys in
    place for most practical purposes.  Also, in this case RTCP
    protection can be applied smoothly.  Under these assumptions, use of
    the MKI can be omitted.  As the key-derivation in combination with
    large difference in the packet rate in the respective directions may
    require simultaneous storage of several session keys, if storage is
    an issue, we recommended to use low-rate key derivation.
 
    The same considerations can be extended to the unicast scenario with
    multiple RTP sessions, where each session would have a distinct
    master key.
 
 11.2.  Multicast (one sender)
 
    Just as with (unprotected) RTP, a scalability issue arises in big
    groups due to the possibly very large amount of SRTCP Receiver
    Reports that the sender might need to process.  In SRTP, the sender
    may have to keep state (the cryptographic context) for each receiver,
    or more precisely, for the SRTCP used to protect Receiver Reports.
    The overhead increases proportionally to the size of the group.  In
    particular, re-keying requires special concern, see below.
 
    Consider first a small group of receivers.  There are a few possible
    setups with the distribution of master keys among the receivers.
    Given a single RTP session, one possibility is that the receivers
    share the same master key as per Section 9.1 to secure all their
    respective RTCP traffic.  This shared master key could then be the
    same one used by the sender to protect its outbound SRTP traffic.
    Alternatively, it could be a master key shared only among the
    receivers and used solely for their SRTCP traffic.  Both alternatives
    require the receivers to trust each other.
 
    Considering SRTCP and key storage, it is recommended to use low-rate
    (or zero) key_derivation (except the mandatory initial one), so that
    the sender does not need to store too many session keys (each SRTCP
    stream might otherwise have a different session key at a given point
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    in time, as the SRTCP sources send at different times).  Thus, in
    case key derivation is wanted for SRTP, the cryptographic context for
    SRTP can be kept separate from the SRTCP crypto context, so that it
    is possible to have a key_derivation_rate of 0 for SRTCP and a non-
    zero value for SRTP.
 
    Use of the MKI for re-keying is RECOMMENDED for most applications
    (see Section 8.1).
 
    If there are more than one SRTP/SRTCP stream (within the same RTP
    session) that share the master key, the upper limit of 2^48 SRTP
    packets / 2^31 SRTCP packets means that, before one of the streams
    reaches its maximum number of packets, re-keying MUST be triggered on
    ALL streams sharing the master key.  (From strict security point of
    view, only the stream reaching the maximum would need to be re-keyed,
    but then the streams would no longer be sharing master key, which is
    the intention.)  A local policy at the sender side should force
    rekeying in a way that the maximum packet limit is not reached on any
    of the streams.  Use of the MKI for re-keying is RECOMMENDED.
 
    In large multicast with one sender, the same considerations as for
    the small group multicast hold.  The biggest issue in this scenario
    is the additional load placed at the sender side, due to the state
    (cryptographic contexts) that has to be maintained for each receiver,
    sending back RTCP Receiver Reports.  At minimum, a replay window
    might need to be maintained for each RTCP source.
 
 11.3.  Re-keying and access control
 
    Re-keying may occur due to access control (e.g., when a member is
    removed during a multicast RTP session), or for pure cryptographic
    reasons (e.g., the key is at the end of its lifetime).  When using
    SRTP default transforms, the master key MUST be replaced before any
    of the index spaces are exhausted for any of the streams protected by
    one and the same master key.
 
    How key management re-keys SRTP implementations is out of scope, but
    it is clear that there are straightforward ways to manage keys for a
    multicast group.  In one-sender multicast, for example, it is
    typically the responsibility of the sender to determine when a new
    key is needed.  The sender is the one entity that can keep track of
    when the maximum number of packets has been sent, as receivers may
    join and leave the session at any time, there may be packet loss and
    delay etc.  In scenarios other than one-sender multicast, other
    methods can be used.  Here, one must take into consideration that key
    exchange can be a costly operation, taking several seconds for a
    single exchange.  Hence, some time before the master key is
    exhausted/expires, out-of-band key management is initiated, resulting
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    in a new master key that is shared with the receiver(s).  In any
    event, to maintain synchronization when switching to the new key,
    group policy might choose between using the MKI and the <From, To>,
    as described in Section 8.1.
 
    For access control purposes, the <From, To> periods are set at the
    desired granularity, dependent on the packet rate.  High rate re-
    keying can be problematic for SRTCP in some large-group scenarios.
    As mentioned, there are potential problems in using the SRTP index,
    rather than the SRTCP index, for determining the master key.  In
    particular, for short periods during switching of master keys, it may
    be the case that SRTCP packets are not under the current master key
    of the correspondent SRTP.  Therefore, using the MKI for re-keying in
    such scenarios will produce better results.
 
 11.4.  Summary of basic scenarios
 
    The description of these scenarios highlights some recommendations on
    the use of SRTP, mainly related to re-keying and large scale
    multicast:
 
    - Do not use fast re-keying with the <From, To> feature.  It may, in
      particular, give problems in retrieving the correct SRTCP key, if
      an SRTCP packet arrives close to the re-keying time.  The MKI
      SHOULD be used in this case.
 
    - If multiple SRTP streams in the same RTP session share the same
      master key, also moderate rate re-keying MAY have the same
      problems, and the MKI SHOULD be used.
 
    - Though offering increased security, a non-zero key_derivation_rate
      is NOT RECOMMENDED when trying to minimize the number of keys in
      use with multiple streams.
 
 12.  IANA Considerations
 
    The RTP specification establishes a registry of profile names for use
    by higher-level control protocols, such as the Session Description
    Protocol (SDP), to refer to transport methods.  This profile
    registers the name "RTP/SAVP".
 
    SRTP uses cryptographic transforms which a key management protocol
    signals.  It is the task of each particular key management protocol
    to register the cryptographic transforms or suites of transforms with
    IANA.  The key management protocol conveys these protocol numbers,
    not SRTP, and each key management protocol chooses the numbering
    scheme and syntax that it requires.
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    Specification of a key management protocol for SRTP is out of scope
    here.  Section 8.2, however, provides guidance on the parameters that
    need to be defined for the default and mandatory transforms.
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 Appendix A: Pseudocode for Index Determination
 
    The following is an example of pseudo-code for the algorithm to
    determine the index i of an SRTP packet with sequence number SEQ.  In
    the following, signed arithmetic is assumed.
 
          if (s_l < 32,768)
             if (SEQ - s_l > 32,768)
                set v to (ROC-1) mod 2^32
             else
                set v to ROC
             endif
          else
             if (s_l - 32,768 > SEQ)
                set v to (ROC+1) mod 2^32
             else
                set v to ROC
             endif
          endif
          return SEQ + v*65,536
 
 Appendix B: Test Vectors
 
    All values are in hexadecimal.
 
 B.1.  AES-f8 Test Vectors
 
    SRTP PREFIX LENGTH  :   0
 
    RTP packet header   :   806e5cba50681de55c621599
 
    RTP packet payload  :   70736575646f72616e646f6d6e657373
                            20697320746865206e65787420626573
                            74207468696e67
 
    ROC                 :   d462564a
    key                 :   234829008467be186c3de14aae72d62c
    salt key            :   32f2870d
    key-mask (m)        :   32f2870d555555555555555555555555
    key XOR key-mask    :   11baae0dd132eb4d3968b41ffb278379
 
    IV                  :   006e5cba50681de55c621599d462564a
    IV’                 :   595b699bbd3bc0df26062093c1ad8f73
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    j = 0
    IV’ xor j           :   595b699bbd3bc0df26062093c1ad8f73
    S(-1)               :   00000000000000000000000000000000
    IV’ xor S(-1) xor j :   595b699bbd3bc0df26062093c1ad8f73
    S(0)                :   71ef82d70a172660240709c7fbb19d8e
    plaintext           :   70736575646f72616e646f6d6e657373
    ciphertext          :   019ce7a26e7854014a6366aa95d4eefd
 
    j = 1
    IV’ xor j           :   595b699bbd3bc0df26062093c1ad8f72
    S(0)                :   71ef82d70a172660240709c7fbb19d8e
    IV’ xor S(0) xor j  :   28b4eb4cb72ce6bf020129543a1c12fc
    S(1)                :   3abd640a60919fd43bd289a09649b5fc
    plaintext           :   20697320746865206e65787420626573
    ciphertext          :   1ad4172a14f9faf455b7f1d4b62bd08f
 
    j = 2
    IV’ xor j           :   595b699bbd3bc0df26062093c1ad8f71
    S(1)                :   3abd640a60919fd43bd289a09649b5fc
    IV’ xor S(1) xor j  :   63e60d91ddaa5f0b1dd4a93357e43a8d
    S(2)                :   220c7a8715266565b09ecc8a2a62b11b
    plaintext           :   74207468696e67
    ciphertext          :   562c0eef7c4802
 
 B.2.  AES-CM Test Vectors
 
     Keystream segment length: 1044512 octets (65282 AES blocks)
     Session Key:      2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
     Rollover Counter: 00000000
     Sequence Number:  0000
     SSRC:             00000000
     Session Salt:     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFD0000 (already shifted)
     Offset:           F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFD0000
 
     Counter                            Keystream
 
     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFD0000   E03EAD0935C95E80E166B16DD92B4EB4
     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFD0001   D23513162B02D0F72A43A2FE4A5F97AB
     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFD0002   41E95B3BB0A2E8DD477901E4FCA894C0
     ...                                ...
     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFDFEFF   EC8CDF7398607CB0F2D21675EA9EA1E4
     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFDFF00   362B7C3C6773516318A077D7FC5073AE
     F0F1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9FAFBFCFDFF01   6A2CC3787889374FBEB4C81B17BA6C44
 
    Nota Bene: this test case is contrived so that the latter part of the
    keystream segment coincides with the test case in Section F.5.1 of
    [CTR].
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 B.3.  Key Derivation Test Vectors
 
    This section provides test data for the default key derivation
    function, which uses AES-128 in Counter Mode.  In the following, we
    walk through the initial key derivation for the AES-128 Counter Mode
    cipher, which requires a 16 octet session encryption key and a 14
    octet session salt, and an authentication function which requires a
    94-octet session authentication key.  These values are called the
    cipher key, the cipher salt, and the auth key in the following.
    Since this is the initial key derivation and the key derivation rate
    is equal to zero, the value of (index DIV key_derivation_rate) is
    zero (actually, a six-octet string of zeros).  In the following, we
    shorten key_derivation_rate to kdr.
 
    The inputs to the key derivation function are the 16 octet master key
    and the 14 octet master salt:
 
       master key:  E1F97A0D3E018BE0D64FA32C06DE4139
       master salt: 0EC675AD498AFEEBB6960B3AABE6
 
    We first show how the cipher key is generated.  The input block for
    AES-CM is generated by exclusive-oring the master salt with the
    concatenation of the encryption key label 0x00 with (index DIV kdr),
    then padding on the right with two null octets (which implements the
    multiply-by-2^16 operation, see Section 4.3.3).  The resulting value
    is then AES-CM- encrypted using the master key to get the cipher key.
 
       index DIV kdr:                 000000000000
       label:                       00
       master salt:   0EC675AD498AFEEBB6960B3AABE6
       -----------------------------------------------
       xor:           0EC675AD498AFEEBB6960B3AABE6     (x, PRF input)
 
       x*2^16:        0EC675AD498AFEEBB6960B3AABE60000 (AES-CM input)
 
       cipher key:    C61E7A93744F39EE10734AFE3FF7A087 (AES-CM output)
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    Next, we show how the cipher salt is generated.  The input block for
    AES-CM is generated by exclusive-oring the master salt with the
    concatenation of the encryption salt label.  That value is padded and
    encrypted as above.
 
       index DIV kdr:                 000000000000
       label:                       02
       master salt:   0EC675AD498AFEEBB6960B3AABE6
 
       ----------------------------------------------
       xor:           0EC675AD498AFEE9B6960B3AABE6     (x, PRF input)
 
       x*2^16:        0EC675AD498AFEE9B6960B3AABE60000 (AES-CM input)
 
                      30CBBC08863D8C85D49DB34A9AE17AC6 (AES-CM ouptut)
 
       cipher salt:   30CBBC08863D8C85D49DB34A9AE1
 
    We now show how the auth key is generated.  The input block for AES-
    CM is generated as above, but using the authentication key label.
 
       index DIV kdr:                   000000000000
       label:                         01
       master salt:     0EC675AD498AFEEBB6960B3AABE6
       -----------------------------------------------
       xor:             0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE6     (x, PRF input)
 
       x*2^16:          0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60000 (AES-CM input)
 
    Below, the auth key is shown on the left, while the corresponding AES
    input blocks are shown on the right.
 
    auth key                           AES input blocks
    CEBE321F6FF7716B6FD4AB49AF256A15   0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60000
    6D38BAA48F0A0ACF3C34E2359E6CDBCE   0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60001
    E049646C43D9327AD175578EF7227098   0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60002
    6371C10C9A369AC2F94A8C5FBCDDDC25   0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60003
    6D6E919A48B610EF17C2041E47403576   0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60004
    6B68642C59BBFC2F34DB60DBDFB2       0EC675AD498AFEEAB6960B3AABE60005
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